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The objective of the paper “Crime Displacement and Police Interventions: Evidence from 
London’s “Operation Theseus”” is to present evidence on the casual impact of police 
presence on crime rates and investigate its indirect effects through potential crime 
displacement. Using weekly data of crime and police force in London for the period 
between January 1
st 2004 to December 31
st 2005, the authors find an elasticity of crime 
with respect to police of approximately -0.3. In contrast with this clear direct effect, the 
authors do not find any evidence of significant spatial or intertemporal displacement in 
crime during or after the intervention took place.  
 
Without a doubt, the question that the authors are interested in is of extreme importance. 
Previous work, such as Levitt (1997), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) and Klick and 
Taborrak (2005), have established the direct effect of police force in crime reduction. 
However, as the authors mention, less attention has been given to the potential indirect 
effects these policies might bring. Understanding the possible indirect effects that increases 
in police deployment could bring to criminal behavior is important in practical terms. If 
there is indeed criminal displacement, either temporal or spatial, the effectiveness of 
transitory deterrence interventions previously found in the literature could be very limited 
and its application should hence be carefully evaluated.  
 
The classical and most difficult problem to solve in studies of the effect of deterrence 
measures on crime is the endogeneity between both variables. In order to tackle with it, the 
authors follow the idea of previous work in which terrorist attacks allow the emergence of a 
quasi-experiment. Specifically, they used the fact that after the July 2005 London terrorist 
attacks, the police force in the center of the city increased by more than 30% for a 
consecutive period of six weeks. Such an increase, referred by the police force as Operation 
Theseus, can be catalogued as an exogenous change in police force that was not related to 
the crime rate in the area. Moreover, as explained by the authors, this change in deployment 
was achieved using extra-hours of work and hence no reduction of police force in other 
sectors of the city was necessary. It is precisely this last aspect of the policy that allows the 
authors to study any displacement effect. 
 
Under such scenario the authors employ an IV estimation methodology that directly tries to 
identify the casual impact of the number of police deployed on crime rates. In the first stage 
they estimate changes in police deployment using Operation Theseus as the instrumental 
variable. This clear and powerful exogenous variation of police force, allow the authors in 
the second stage to estimate an elasticity of crime of -0.3. To analyze the possible 
displacement effects, the authors define different dummy variables measuring either time or 
location. Specifically, to analyze spatial displacement the authors use as pseudo-treatment 
boroughs those immediately around the actual treated ones. To analyze intertemporal 
displacement they define two treatment periods: one during the six weeks of operation 
Theseus and the second one with the remaining weeks of 2005 after the operation took 
place. In none of these alternative specifications the authors are able to reject the hypothesis that there are no significant spatial or intertemporal displacement effects of crime caused by 
Operation Theseus.  
  
I believe the article clearly provides further evidence on the causal relationship of police on 
crime rates. It uses a clever idea of a quasi-experiment, is very well written and indeed 
convinces the reader on the issues dealt. Furthermore, as previously mentioned it deals with 
a question that has been understudied in the economics literature. However, there are some 
small comments that should be kept in mind related to the estimations presented and future 
research that in my opinion could in principle be a very interesting agenda.  
 
The first comment relates to the policy implications of the study. From the IV estimates we 
find that a 10% increase in police force could reduce crime rates by almost 3%. This effect 
is large and hence provides further evidence in favor of the convenience of having larger 
police forces in cities suffering from high crime rates. In addition, no evidence is found on 
possible negative effects on crime displacement and hence the estimate of elasticity 
previously mentioned should be accurate. However, it is important to have a cost-benefit 
analysis of these six weeks. Before any policy decision is taken, it is imperative to 
understand whether the costs associated with a bigger police force are compensated by the 
reduction in crime. This is probably not a difficult exercise to carry out and it is certainly a 
very informative one. 
 
The second comment relates to the spatial displacement analysis. The authors implicitly 
assume that displacement will occur only in adjacent boroughs but will not occur to further 
away places. It is reasonable to assume just the opposite. Given that a greater amount of 
policemen were deployed in central London, thieves, burglars and other criminals would 
rather move to further apart areas that are relatively less protected than to displace their 
criminal activities to adjacent areas. It would be interesting to see whether any difference in 
the coefficients is obtained using as pseudo-treatment boroughs those from outer London 
instead of using only boroughs located in the center of the city as it is done in the present 
paper.   
 
A similar suggestion can be raised with the temporal displacement of crime exercises. As 
mentioned, the authors define two treatment periods. The first one is the six weeks in which 
Operation Theseus was in place, while the second one is encompassed by the remaining 
weeks of 2005. It would be interesting to have a third alternative, namely the six weeks 
immediately after Operation Theseus was in place. Even though there was no change in 
police deployment compared to the previous year, the reduction in police force during these 
six weeks must have been evident for citizens and hence a change in criminal behavior 
could have taken place. This exercise could also shed light on an alternative view in which 
there is an inertial behavior of crime.  
 
The last comment is related to the type of crimes analyzed by the authors in this and in their 
companion paper.
1 In the present paper the analysis evolves around what the authors call 
“susceptible crimes”. Although it is explained in more detail in Draka et al. (2008), 
                                                 
1 Draca, M. S. Machin and R. Witt (2008) Panic on the Streets of London: Police, Crime and the July 2005 
Terror Attacks, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 852. according to the authors this group is made up by violence and sexual offenses, theft and 
robbery. Non susceptible crimes on the other hand are burglary and criminal damage. The 
results in their first paper show that while police deployment could indeed reduce the 
incidence of “susceptible crimes” it had no effect on burglary or criminal damage. 
Unfortunately, in this displacement paper, the authors do not present any evidence on the 
possibility of crime displacement among boroughs. Is it the case that after the increase in 
police deployment in the treated areas, different types of crimes increased in other areas? It 
would be very interesting to see this exercise in the future. 
 
Moreover, I believe that the analysis of types of crimes above suggested will not demand 
such an ad-hoc division between them. In Draka et al. (2008) the authors’ main argument to 
justify the division between susceptible and non susceptible crimes is that burglary and 
criminal damage are more prevalent in residential areas or frequently occur at night. In my 
opinion, it is difficult to foresee why a burglar will not be deterred if more police is visible 
while a rapist (that one would think are precisely the crimes that occur at night) or common 
thief will be. Moreover the results in the first paper suggest that crimes against people were 
affected while crimes against property were not. This actually could go against of what the 
authors would like to prove in their first paper with respect to the non existence of any 
uncorrelated shocks after the attacks took place. The number of houses or property did not 
change and no effect was found there. The number of people traveling in the tube in central 
London was reduced and crimes against people also were reduced.  
 
Perhaps, a much cleaner division to study the whether displacement in the types of crime 
took place would be to compare the effect on crimes that occur during the day vs. those that 
took place at night, irrespective of their type. Probably during the day not only is the higher 
security more evident but the vision of policemen is higher. At night neither the criminals 
nor the policemen can see each other and hence it will be expected that the crime rates can 
not be reduced as much. I believe that such an analysis of types of crimes committed will 
greatly enrich what already is an excellent paper and will show the reader a third possibility 
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